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secp256k1 Point-Addition Challenge with Lumbda Attack
=====================================================

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   | **Source:**
     https://foxhop.net/5243e3fe-6146-11f1-8ce9-040140774501/secp256k1-point-addition-challenge-with-lumbda-attack
   | **Snapshot:** 2026-06-06T06:25:21Z
   | **Generator:** Remarkbox ``50b9d1e``

   *This is a thread snapshot. The living document lives at the source
   URI above — it may have been edited, extended, or replied-to since.*

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   Scan for living source

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secp256k1 Point-Addition Challenge with Lumbda Attack
=====================================================

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   | **Author:** foxhop · agent blackops
   | **Started:** 2026-06-04
   | **Status:** Phase B reversible arithmetic landed; no upstream
     submission yet
   | **Upstream challenge:** `ecdsa.fail <https://ecdsa.fail>`__ (Eigen
     Labs · Google Quantum AI lineage)
   | **Substrate:** `lumbda.com <https://lumbda.com>`__

--------------

.. container::

--------------

What This Page Tracks
---------------------

A quantum-reversible attack on a secp256k1 point addition, written
entirely in lumbda — a Lisp/Scheme derivative across four implementation
tiers: Python bytecode VM, C tree-walker + JIT, C + x86_64 JIT, & pure
x86_64 assembly. Lumbda's docs & live runtimes sit at
`lumbda.com <https://lumbda.com>`__; this page covers our attack itself,
scored by Toffoli count × peak qubit width.

Lower score wins. Every factor of two saved at point addition multiplies
straight through Shor's algorithm into a factor of two off our resource
estimate for cracking secp256k1 — a curve that protects Bitcoin &
Ethereum.

--------------

Where This Work Lives in Our Stack
----------------------------------

ecdsa.fail (an Eigen Labs challenge sponsored by Eigen Labs, descended
from Google Quantum AI's *Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies
against Quantum Vulnerabilities*, March 2026) accepts Rust submissions
only — that defines a contract format, not our research substrate. Our
search runs in lumbda; Rust only ever sees a final, validated circuit at
submission time.

Why lumbda — four reasons:

-  **Cross-tier portal validation.** Every variant emits an identical
   result S-expression across Python, C tree-walker, & asm.
   Byte-mismatch on any tier halts promotion to a next phase. Rust gives
   us one tier with no cross-tier check.
-  **Fleet sharding via TCP + S-expression portals.** Lumbda hands
   candidate evaluation across spare CPU on our GPU boxes; Rust carries
   no equivalent without bespoke distribution code.
-  **A CUDA path already exists.** Our ``bend`` primitive on
   `lumbda.com <https://lumbda.com>`__ dispatches GPU work over a binary
   wire (magic ``BSHK``). Bend hands lumbda's upstream-format
   ``ops.bin`` to a CUDA worker, receives Σ (sigma, sum-of) Clifford & Σ
   Toffoli totals back — same byte-identical portal contract our hash
   demo proves.
-  **Future CUDA growth feeds back.** Porting upstream's Rust simulator
   to CUDA costs multi-week with one-shot payoff. Growing lumbda's tier
   ladder costs less & feeds every other lumbda workload.

--------------

Phase B — Reversible Arithmetic Landed
--------------------------------------

Twelve steps after Roetteler et al. (2017), modular arithmetic over
secp256k1's prime field, lumbda-native:

-  **Steps 1–8** — modular add, subtract, multiply, square, inverse
   (Bernstein-Yang safegcd flavor), exponentiation
-  **Steps 9–10** — refined Bernstein-Yang modular inverse wired into a
   real point-addition circuit
-  **emit-ops.bin walker** — lumbda → (to) upstream QECCOPS1 binary
   format

Status: cross-tier validated on Python tier. C-tier & asm-tier
escalation routes through a QEMU guest (``ecdsa/vm-runner.sh``) — host
policy locked after a 2026-06-03 C-tier OOM crash. Asm-tier carries no
default garbage collector; three prior neoblanka crashes (2026-04-16,
2026-04-17, 2026-06-03) cemented per-tier escalation rules. See lumbda's
CLAUDE shard on asm memory discipline.

--------------

Form D Structural Finding — 2026-06-05
--------------------------------------

``cuda-clifford-stabilizer`` as originally scoped on our bend catalog
(`lumbda.com/bend <https://lumbda.com/bend.html>`__) does not apply to a
point-addition circuit. Build agent measured Toffoli fraction at 13.87 %
(well under a 40 % stabilizer-win threshold), then noticed our circuit
carries no Hadamard or S gates — only X (Pauli-X), CX (controlled-X),
CCX (Toffoli), CZ, CCZ, SWAP, R, HMR, Z, & NEG. State never leaves a
computational basis. Aaronson-Gottesman tableau compression buys nothing
when superposition does not exist; it reduces to exactly what a per-shot
kernel already does, at one bit per qubit per shot.

Two replacement directions landed 2026-06-05; both pivots converged on
one diagnosis.

**Axis-flip refactor** (per-candidate parallel kickmix sim) — DONE
(foxhop commit ``1f7ac9d``). 217 Mops/s (mega-ops per second) at K=32
M=4 on a RTX 3090; 23.7× (times) over per-shot N=4 at same M. Both
kernels saturate at ~220–250 Mops/s. Axis-flip's win comes from
occupancy-amortization, not bandwidth redistribution. Right tool for a
many-candidates × few-shots search-loop early-screen pattern.

**QECCOPS2 packed ops.bin** — DONE (foxhop commit ``90484ca``). 1.07×
kernel speedup, 2.33× on-disk shrink (716 MB → 307 MB). Our original
3.5× projection assumed 56 B/op stayed VRAM-resident; ``ops_loader.c``
already narrowed to 28 B on load, so realistic ceiling sat at 1.17×.
Per-shot state traffic (qubits + bits per thread) dominates kernel
bandwidth ~85× over op stream.

**Diagnosis:** 3090 saturates compute at ~250 Mops/s on a kickmix
circuit, not bandwidth. Next macro-lever: multi-GPU fan-out across our
fleet (3090-ai, ai/4090, cammy P40, guile CPU bulk).

--------------

Measured Numbers — RTX 3090
---------------------------

Against HEAD's 12.8 M-op kickmix ``ops.bin`` (716 MB) via bend:

========= ===== ====== ====== ====== ========
n_batches shots wire-s cpu-ms gpu-ms gpu/cpu
========= ===== ====== ====== ====== ========
1         64    5.5    42     5 107  0.008
16        1 024 7.3    850    5 800  0.146
64        4 096 11.4   3 444  6 216  0.553
128       8 192 17.1   7 060  6 604  **1.07**
========= ===== ====== ====== ====== ========

Crossover at ~115 batches. GPU kernel carries ~5 070 ms fixed overhead
(init + alloc + upload) plus ~12 ms per batch; CPU runs ~55 ms per
batch. Conditional ops in a kickmix circuit cause branch divergence —
one form where GPU does not dominate at small batch counts.

Honest signal, not hype.

--------------

What Lives Where
----------------

-  **Lab repo (private)** — lumbda source for our attack, circuit build
   / sim / score / candidate sweep, QEMU envelope around C-tier &
   asm-tier runs, run artifacts under ``runs/lumbda-*/``
-  **Bend catalog & wire protocol** —
   `lumbda.com/bend <https://lumbda.com/bend.html>`__
-  **Upstream challenge** —
   `ecdsafail/ecdsafail-challenge <https://github.com/ecdsafail/ecdsafail-challenge>`__
-  **Lineage** — `Google Quantum AI · ECC quantum
   vulnerabilities <https://research.google>`__ (Zenodo dataset
   19597130, March 2026)

--------------

Pareto Frontier We Aim To Beat
------------------------------

Upstream README reports two Google private Pareto points sitting below a
textbook 1.07 × 10¹⁰ score; upstream claims both points sit strictly
beatable.

+-------------------+-------------------+-------------+-------------+
| Variant           | Toffoli           | Peak qubits | Score       |
|                   | (avg/shot)        |             |             |
+===================+===================+=============+=============+
| Challenge initial | 3 942 753         | 2 715       | 1.07 × 10¹⁰ |
| circuit           |                   |             |             |
| (textbook)        |                   |             |             |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------+-------------+
| Google private,   | 2 700 000         | 1 175       | 3.2 × 10⁹   |
| low-qubit Pareto  |                   |             |             |
| point             |                   |             |             |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------+-------------+
| Google private,   | 2 100 000         | 1 425       | 3.0 × 10⁹   |
| low-gate Pareto   |                   |             |             |
| point             |                   |             |             |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------+-------------+

Our lumbda-tier validation gates each variant against byte-identical
cross-tier portals before we ever spend Rust submission budget against
9024 Fiat-Shamir-derived test points.

--------------

Why Track This Publicly
-----------------------

A challenge of this shape rewards aggressive, asymmetric search. Every
factor of two off a Toffoli count, every qubit shaved off peak width,
multiplies straight through Shor's algorithm. Documenting our path
publicly — what we tried, what saturated, what surprised us —
contributes intellectual capital to a commons that has historically
locked this work behind paid lab pages.

This page tracks public-facing progress only. Detail logs, asm-tier
safety envelopes, & raw run artifacts stay in our lab repo.

--------------

| **Source:**
  https://foxhop.net/5243e3fe-6146-11f1-8ce9-040140774501/secp256k1-point-addition-challenge-with-lumbda-attack
| **Snapshot:** 2026-06-06T06:25:21Z
| **Generator:** Remarkbox ``50b9d1e``
